





Lima Declaration
Durban Commitment
|
The 9th International Anti-Corruption Conference
The Papers
DIAGNOSING JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE TOWARD A TOOL TO HELP
GUIDE JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAMS;
ANNEXES I-VI
Linn Hammergren
World Bank
ANNEXES
I am appending as Annex I a further description and explanation of my
proposed checklist. The remaining annexes contain examples of others
work. As should be abundantly evident from the prior discussion, the
following is only a brief selection of what might be included. The
first three examples constitute prior attempts at developing judicial
checklists. Only one includes scores (most never got that far), and
as indicated in the accompanying note, the scoring methodology is its
weakest point. Nonetheless, I think it (the Blackton report card) is
the best example of the genre. The fourth and fifth are draft
checklists currently under development by a World Bank member and
several external colleagues, and ABA/CEELI.
I have also included two judicial inventories and referenced the
numerous works resulting from the FIU/ILANDU collaboration. USAID's
list of indicators of judicial performance is too long to include.
It is available through that agency's Global Center for Democracy and
Governance. Neither the inventories nor USAID's indicators are
intended as models for Transparency's proposal. However, they deserve
reading if only as a reminder of the variety of topics that require
coverage in a true assessment of performance.
ANNEX I: Further Explanation of Proposed Checklist Elements
Although I will not go into this in the detail that may have been
expected, I am offering a slightly longer explanation and self
critique of the proposed checklist offered in this paper. The obvious
points for criticism are the following:
- It is still too long and too detailed
- It is not clear why the specific categories were chosen and what their linkages are
to the desired results or behaviors
- The list of criteria seem somewhat
arbitrarily chosen; it is not evident why these rather than others
were included
- The standards against which the criteria will be
evaluated are not obvious; some seem to imply a universal reference
point, others a relative one, but words like "adequate" or
'sufficient" leave a lot of room for subjectivity
- There remains the
problem of how this list will be used for countries with very
different legal traditions or at different stages of development.
Given resource and other constraints, could Liberia's score, even
after a serious reform, ever be "good"?
I propose to address the criticisms and offer the further explanation
simultaneously, starting with points two and three - the choice of
categories and criteria. The entire list is based on one fundamental
assumption, that a well performing judiciary has the same basic
requirements as any organization - it needs to select the right human
resources, manage them for performance, have adequate administrative
systems and resources, and organize its fundamental business and
operating procedures in a manner commensurate with achieving the
outcome it desires. (I've added the legal profession as part of the
human resource base, although giving it a separate category.) While
one can take issue with each of the elements, either in general or as
applied to the judiciary, or demand empirical verification, if they
don't hold a good deal of the underpinnings of Western civilization
also is called into question. Hence, although we could organize
research to determine whether a selection system is important to the
composite "good performance" (efficacy, efficiency, etc), this seems
less useful than trying to determine what kind of selection system is
most appropriate for choosing judges or judicial administrators.
The application of these general categories to the two other
dimensions (accountability/transparency and independence) is really,
as noted, an extended definition. It also follows the logic that if
these are the key components of a well functioning organization, then
they are also the areas where transparency and independence are most
critical.
If one accepts my first arguments, than the burden of the explanation
falls on the evaluation criteria. These do have an empirical base,
but it rests on collective observations, the product of my and others
experience with a variety of real systems in both developing and
developed countries. As my own experience skews the list, this is
where others comments are most important. I have selected the
criteria with a problem-orientation. This is inevitable, I believe,
because we have a better understanding of where a selection system or
internal administrative processes may fail than what good ones should
look like. This also accounts for the length, and that flaw will only
be aggravated as more pens are put to the task. Possibly once a
definitive working group has accumulated a much longer list, they can
consolidate criteria or weed out some that seem less important.
After doing so, they may want to add an "open" criterion within each
major category, to allow consideration of unusual bad (or good)
practices with a major influence on single systems. However, it is
well to remember that the point is to provide comparable information
on the most important influences on performance, not to cover every
base.
This still begs the question of how the criteria will be applied - and
what kinds of standards or points of reference will be used, and how
differences in legal traditions and the developmental stages of
individual countries will be considered. Obviously if both the
United States and Senegal audit judicial budgets, the former is likely
to do a more thorough job than the latter. Should the scores reflect
that, or should each be evaluated against its own national standards
and needs? Similarly, one would hardly want to hold Senegal to the
standards of equipment and staffing for US or French courts, or to
automatically give the latter two systems high grades because they can
afford more, but possibly not "adequate" courtroom furnishings and
personnel. Fortunately, not all the criteria pose this problem - the
existence of a code of ethics and its enforcement or of set criteria
for selection are probably less dependent on developmental variations.
This may be still more true of those in the transparency and
independence dimensions.
Blackton's use of an external reference point - a system assumed to
set the high performance mark for all others - doesn't really resolve
the issue. It might help on a regional basis. However, intra-
regional differences can also be extreme. On at least some criteria,
it would not be fair to judge Haiti or Honduras against the mark set
by Costa Rica, Chile, or Uruguay. Still, the overall situation tends
to support the wisdom of regionally-based grading. Not only is it
fairer and less vulnerable to protests of cultural insensitivity; it
also is more likely to produce useful results. Knowing how Haiti or
Honduras or even Costa Rica stacks up against the United States isn't
going to tell me much I don't already know. Measuring the first two
against Costa Rica is likely to be more useful, as regards the less
favored country and the problems still confronted by the regional
standard bearer. This should not mean that the highest ranking country
gets the highest possible score in all categories. There will still
be a sort of ideal, if not universal standard; for each region it
should take into account what is possible given the average level of
development, resources, and other environmental constraints. This
would of course have to be explained when the checklist is presented.
ANNEX II: JUDICIAL REPORT CARD (John Blackton, Amideast)
JUDICIAL REFORM ELEMENT |
Grade: 4.0 Scale | NOTES |
| JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE | 2.6 |
Judiciary justly proud of and jealous of its independence, but
history of extra-judicial circumvention of the courts |
| a) appointments and evaluation of judges | 3.8 |
Very independent |
| b)Disciplinary system for Judges | 3.0 |
Independent, but erratic quality |
| c) Executive resort to extra-judicial solutions | 1.0 |
A history of extra-judicial intervention
in political cases - creation of special courts or use of military
courts |
| JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION | 1.75 |
|
| a) Case Administration | 1.5 |
Old procedures once adequate, now moribund and poorly implemented. Lack
of leadership and motivation for those inclined to use the existing
system effectively. |
| b) court Administration | 1.5 |
Overstaffing, poor
quality staff, Poor quality supervision, lack of professional court
managers and court administrators. No Information Tech skills. |
| c) Court Facilities (Size and quantity) | 3.0 |
More than enough capital
plant capacity. Numerous and large courts often used only 15 hours
per week. Better scheduling, longer working hours could double the
court capacity with no new building |
| d) Court Facilities (quality and maintenance) | 1.0 |
Most courts are large and expensively conceived, but
very poorly maintained. Small but steady recurring cost investment
and modern facilities management would pay large dividends at low cost |
PROCEDURAL PROCESSES | 2.0 | |
| a)Access to case information | 2.0 |
Information may be viewed in court files but the files are very
disorganized. |
| b)Process is transparent | 2.0 |
Surface process is knowable with effort. There seems to be a hidden
process known to some. |
| c)Process is standardized | 2.0 |
Surface process is knowable with effort. There seems to be a hidden
process known to some. |
| d)Process is free from inappropriate influence | 2.0 |
Practices vary among circuits and clerks based on unclear criteria
|
| e)Process results in fair judgments | 1.5 |
Experts and service departments operate on extralegal payments for services
|
| f)Judgements believed by the society to be fair | 2.5 |
Judges seem to care about following the law, but don't seem able to
use the law effectively to reach needed conclusions. To the extent
that the result reflects the expert or service depts., the results are
suspect |
| g)Procedural devices aid the truth-finding process | 1.5 |
Society has little respect for the court as a fair and efficient organ
of justice |
| h)Process is efficient | 2.0 |
The goal of many procedures is laudable. In practice the devotion to
detail to the exclusion of overall fairness inhibits truth-finding
Process deals with easier matters fairly well, with more complicated
matters without regard for timely disposition |
| ACCESS T0 JUSTICE | 3.0 | |
| a) Alternative Dispute Mechanisms | 1.5 |
Eight years of American Advice and support, but no implementation. New
approach needed. |
| b) court costs | 4.0 |
Socially Structured and low fee schedule |
| c) Legal Aid or low cost legal services | 3.0 |
No legal aid, but lawyers are plentiful and cheap, no evidence that this is a
significant problem |
| d) small courts for small claims | 3.5 |
A multi-tiered court system with good access for small claims |
| e) Gender barriers to access | 3.0 |
Biggest issue is no women judges, no large
base of documented evidence of systemic bias in case outcomes, but
needs research |
LEGAL & JUDICIAL EDUCATION | 1.75 | |
a) general quality of basic legal preparation | 1.5 |
Low entrance standards for law school.,making it choice of last resort: huge classes,
little modern pedagogy or curriculum. Produces poorly trained and poorly motivated graduates
in the main. Children of Judges a bright spot in a large sea of poor
performers. |
| b) Judges' professional education | 2.0 |
Would be adequate if basic legal education were better. Needs major improvement in light of
actual legal education |
| c) Lawyers' continuing education | - |
Not observed |
| PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS | 2.75 | |
| Judges Associations | 3.0 |
Active, wide membership, professional |
| Lawyers Associations | 2.5 |
Active, politicized |
| Over-arching Judicial-Legal Associations | - |
None, associational links between judges and lawyers very much needed |
Note: as this is the only example for which I have a recorded score,
I asked the author, John Blackton (Blackton@AMIDEAST.ORG) for an
explanation for how it was done. His answer merits citing in detail:
"You are, I believe, quite right in your observation that the
categories are reasonably good, but the metrics are not transparent.
Taxonomy is relatively easy. Rigorous and valid measurement within
that taxonomy is hard work - both intellectually and in terms of field
effort. My quantification would not stand up under examination by any
serious 'methodology maven.' Since I couldn't find any scales or
indices from which to copy, I used an entirely intuitive process. I
chose the 'report card' 1.0-4.0 model because academic grading is also
more art than science and because I didn't want to convey the idea
that this instrument had any pretense of statistical validity. I then
decided that I would take a few areas where I know something [about]
the performance in a range of developing countries
.I chose two
performance categories where I was reasonably familiar with other
countries' performance (e.g. I used Singapore as my 4.0 standard in
Judicial administration and then ranked
against this benchmark).
This gave me two categories for which I had a grade with an external
referent (subjective but still a referent). For the remainder of the
categories I graded them against the two benchmarks since I didn't
have a [good idea]
. where other countries stood
."
ANNEX III: Elements for Evaluating and Identifying Problems
in Judicial Systems
- the legal framework of the country and the role of judges within
this framework
- positions of judges in society and the perception of
the system of administration of justice by the community
- the integrity of the justice system
- the administration of the judicial system
- the economic cost of justice in the country
- access to justice
- the availability of legal information
- legal education and training
- the actual functioning of legal procedures
- physical facilities of courts
- the impact of court decision on society; and
- alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
Source: Ibrahim Shihata, "The World Bank" in Edmundo Jarquin and
Fernando Carrillo, editors, Justice Delayed: Judicial Reform in Latin
America. Inter-American Development Bank, 1998, p. 120.
ANNEX IV: Checklist for Institutional Evaluation of Judiciary
[This is a working draft supplied by Richard Messick of the World
Bank. The initial note, directed to the co-authors, has been left in
as a good illustration of how these exercises proceed. To my own
mind, this is more of an inventory than a checklist, and while the
authors intend it for general application, I'm not sure how one would
compare the results. I am also not convinced they have successfully
tied their initial problem identification to the judiciary, especially
as regards nonsurvey data. There are many extra-judicial explanations
for a low incidence of contract-intensive money -- no banks, lack of
familiarity with banking practices, various disincentives to putting
money there. For example, Ecuador's recent introduction of a 1
percent tax on all financial transactions led to an immediate decrease
in bank deposits -- 25 percent or more -- with no change in the
judicial system ]
"I have reshuffled the indicators as we discussed, putting all those
based on opinion, either the opinion of the public generally or the
opinion of more select groups (lawyers, judges, business people, or
whatever) in Part 1. As originally written, Part II had three main
sections, 'Courts,' 'Private Attorneys,' and 'Prosecutors,' and
'Courts' had four subparts. Per Antoine's suggestion, I have put the
sections on lawyers and prosecutors under one of the subparts for
Courts, "Competence of Personnel." We should probably also move some
of the material on prosecutors, particularly the portions on
independence, to other subparts. Also, there are two quantitative
indicators from Part 1, homicides per 100,000 and the prison measures
that Santos is to supply, that do not fit under any of the four
divisions in Part 2. Perhaps we should rename the third one, now
called simply 'Efficiency,' 'Efficiency and Effectiveness'?"
Assessing the Performance of the Judicial System
Using Opinion and Quantitative Data
Opinions About the Performance of the Judicial System
A. Deter Wrongful Conduct
Public Opinion Measures --
- Percent of population fearful of crime
- Percent of population expressing confidence in state's ability to
protect them from crime
- Percent of population willing to report crime to authorities
Opinions of Key Informants --
- Degree to which crime and theft are obstacle to conducting business
II. Facilitate Voluntary Exchange
Opinions of Key Informants --
- Predictability of judicial decisions
- Bank/finance company use of secured credit
III. Resolve Private Disputes
Public Opinion Measures --
- Percent of population that has submitted private dispute to court
system in past 5 years
- Percent of above expressing satisfaction with how dispute handled
- Percent of above reporting dispute resolved timely
- Percent of above reporting dispute resolved at reasonable cost
- Citizen perception of courts' ability to resolve private dispute
impartially
- Citizen perception of courts' ability to resolve private dispute
timely
- Citizen perception of courts' ability to resolve private dispute at
reasonable cost
- Percent of population that has submitted dispute to some form of
alternative dispute resolution mechanism within the past five years.
[labor or family say?]
- Percent of those expressing satisfaction with ADR
IV. Redress Abuses of Power
Public Opinion Measures --
- Percent of population that has brought a case against a government
entity (including police) in a court or tribunal [better definition
needed?] in past 5 years
- Percent of above expressing satisfaction with how case handled
- Percent reporting case resolved timely
- Percent reporting case resolved at reasonable cost
- Citizen perception of courts' ability to resolve dispute with
government impartially
- Citizen perception of courts' ability to resolve dispute with
government timely
- Citizen perception of courts' ability to resolve dispute with
government at reasonable cost
- Parliamentarians' perceptions of courts effectiveness in redressing
executive abuses of power [split between government and non-government
party members]
- Government administrators' perceptions of courts effectiveness in
redressing executive abuses of power
- Human rights activists' perceptions of courts effectiveness in
redressing executive abuses of power
Quantitative Measures of the Performance of a Judicial System
I) Courts
Information would be gathered on four dimensions. While some of the
quantitative data would call for significant collection effort, in
many cases a close approximation can be had by asking either a sample
of significant users of the system (banks, government agencies, etc.)
or informed observers (lawyers, court personnel, media).
A.- Independence and Acountability:
1) Indicadores de independencia política (independence of other
braches of governement):
1.1.- El gobierno de la Justicia: ¿a quien corresponde? (¿Ministerio
de Justicia? ¿Consejo de la Magistratura o similar? Funciones
respectivas).
1.2.- Selección de jueces: ¿cómo se realiza? (Quien fija
las pruebas, quien nombra al tribunal examinador).
1.3.- El nombramiento y promoción de los jueces: [removal] ¿a quien
corresponde?
1.4.- El presupuesto de la Justicia: ¿quién lo determina?
¿quién lo administra?
1.5.- Demandas contra la policía, el ejército o
las fuerzas de seguridad:
1.5 a.- ¿quién y cuando puede presentarlas?
1.5 b.- ¿quién las examina y resuelve?
1.5 c.- ¿con qué resultado?
1.6.- ¿Qué imagen de independencia de la Justicia respecto del
Gobierno prevalece entre...
1.6 a: la ciudadanía
1.6 b: los profesionales jurídicos
1.6 c: [internal?]
1.7.- ¿Existen
informaciones cualificadas y creíbles (reportajes de prensa,
informaciones de expertos, etc...) acerca de quiebras de la
independencia judicial por presiones políticas? ¿Qué casos, con qué
frecuencia, con qué consecuencias?
1.8.- Los jueces y la política:
¿pueden militar en partidos políticos? ¿Pueden presentarse a
elecciones políticas: en qué condiciones y con qué limitaciones? 1.9.-
La configuración del Ministerio Público:
1.9 a.- ¿Forma parte del
sistema judicial o pertenece a la esfera gubernamental?
1.9 b.-Selección, nombramiento y ascenso de sus componentes.
2) Indicadores de independencia respecto de grupos sociales y
económicos:
2.1.- Estabilidad y amovibilidad de los jueces: 2.1 a.- ¿Todos los
jueces son profesionales (ie., permanentes)? 2.1 b.- ¿Cuál es la
mecánica de los traslados y ascensos?
2.2.- Asociacionismo/sindicalismo judicial:¿existe? ¿Con qué
características? ¿Con qué grado de afiliación?
2.3.- Casos de corrupción (soborno/cohecho/prevaricación): número de casos
oficialmente reconocidos en los últimos 5 años.
2.4.- Quien denuncia,
investiga y sanciona casos de corrupción judicial
2.5.- Imagen predominante de los jueces, en cuanto a grado de corrupción/honestidad
(actual, en comparación con cinco años antes) entre:
2.5 a.- la población general
2.5 b.- los usuarios de la justicia
2.5 c.-informantes cualificados (profesionales jurídicos, periodistas)
2.6.-
Jubilación de los jueces: edad de jubilación (¿es posible jubilación
anticipada? ¿quién la decide? ¿en qué condiciones?; situación
económica de la jubilación.
2.7.- El prestigio social de los jueces
("auctoritas"): [by level]
2.7 a: en opinión de los propios jueces
2.7 b: según la ciudadanía
2.7 c: según informantes cualificados.
2.8.-Grado de confianza que, en conjunto, los jueces inspiran a la
ciudadanía.
3) How does the compensation of judges and other court personnel
compare with similarly situated individuals in the private sectors?
Sub-questions: What is the annual salary of a judge of a first
instance court and how does this amount compare with either the
minimum wage, the average wage, or the average salary for lawyers in
the country? What is the annual salary of the lowest level clerk in a
first instance court? How does this amount compare with the minimum
wage or the average wage?
RICK's Note: Some of the questions in this section belong in Part I,
opinion data.
3.- ¿Ante quién y como rinden cuentas los Jueces? (Acountability?
3.1 ¿Ante quién rinde cuentas de su actuación el sistema judicial ("el
poder judicial") en su conjunto?
3.2 ¿Deben rendir cuentas de su
gestión (asuntos recibidos, asuntos resueltos, etc..) los distintos
tribunales? ¿Ante quien?
3.3 ¿Existen estadísticas públicas sobre la
actividad de los tribunales? ¿Quién las publica? ¿con que´grado de
detalle y fiabilidad?
3.4 ¿Quién y como juzga los delitos cometidos
por jueces?
3.5 ¿Quién y como juzga los casos civiles en que una de
las partes es un juez?
B. Competence of Personnel
a) Court Personnel
- How are judges selected, promoted and disciplined?
Sub-questions: What type of training is required of individuals
before they become tenured judges? Is in-service training required
before promotion? What methods are there for disciplining judges? How
many judges have been penalized under these procedures in the past 5
years? How many have resigned to avoid disciplinary action in the
past 5 years?
- Is there a civil service-like system for hiring and promoting court
personnel?
b) Private Attorneys/Notaries
- Is the market for legal services competitive?
Sub-questions: How many lawyers in active private practice are there
per 100,000? Notaries? Are there restrictions on entry into the
legal or notarial profession? What are the criteria? Where an
examination is required, what percentage of applicants pass the exam
on the first try? Subsequent tries? Are legal fees regulated by law?
By a professional association? Are lawyers and notaries permitted to
advertise?
- How are lawyers and notaries held accountable for their
performance?
Sub-questions: Are there ethical rules governing the practice of law?
Who sets these rules? Who enforces them? How many lawyer/notaries
have been disciplined in the past 12 months for violating these rules?
Do courts have the power to hold lawyers in contempt for failure to
appear or failing to file a pleading? Is this power regularly
exercised?
c) Public Prosecutors
- What is the number of individuals with power to charge per 100,000?
Number of individuals responsible for prosecuting cases per 100,000?
- What checks exist on decisions made by these individuals? [move to
independence and accountability section?]
Sub-questions: Is the decision to charge recognized as discretionary?
Where it is, are there guidelines for how this discretion is to be
exercised? Are these guidelines public? Is there a system of
hierarchical responsibility for those with the power to charge? Who
supervises the department/agency that employs these individuals? How
is this official appointed and to whom is this official accountable?
Where prosecution and investigation separate, same questions for
prosecutors.
- Are those with the power to charge/prosecute able to exercise
independent judgement? [move to independence and accountability
section?]
Sub-questions: What is the annual salary of an entry level
prosecutor/charger and how does this amount compare with either the
minimum wage, the average wage, or the average salary for lawyers in
the country? Are prosecutors/chargers tenured? For how long? What
percent of prosecutors/chargers are serving under an exception to the
normal tenure rules? Can prosecutors/chargers be transferred without
their consent? Is their compensation, including pension, fixed while
they are in office? How are prosecutors/chargers selected and
promoted?
- Do lawyers, judges, and executive branch personnel believe the
decision to charge/prosecute is more or less influenced by politics
than it was five years ago? [move to opinion part]
C. Efficiency [and Effectiveness?]
1) What percentage of court's time is spent on non-court matters?
2) Number of Civil [define precisely] Cases Filed per year/Number of
Cases Disposed per year [sometimes called the Cappelletti-Clark index]
3) Reversal rates/Predictability: What percentage of cases are
appealed from first to second instance courts? What percentage of
those appealed are affirmed? What percentage of cases are attacked
collaterally? What percentage of these are affirmed? Where the rules
provide an abbreviated procedure for bringing certain types of claims
(amparo, special writ, etc.), what percentage of such cases are
rejected on procedural grounds? Where a final judgement has been
entered invalidating the action of an executive agency, what is the
scope of the court's ruling? Does it invalidate the action in all
instances? Or only with respect to the party bringing the action?
4) Who uses the courts and for what purposes?
Sub-questions: What are the five most common type of non-criminal
cases heard by first instance courts? What percentage of the total
docket are accounted for by these cases? Who are the most frequent
users of the non-criminal first instance courts? For what kinds of
cases? What is the most common outcome?
5) Are the private and social costs of litigation aligned?
Sub-questions: Do civil litigants have to pay a fee to bring suit?
What impact do these fees have on the propensity to sue? How are
these fees determined? What share of the civil courts' budget is paid
for out of fees collected from litigants? Are there any provisions
that require the losing party in a civil case to pay the prevailing
party's legal fees? Are they enforced? When they are, what
percentage of actual fees are reimbursed? Is there a fee required to
appeal? Is there a fee required to lodge a collateral attack? Are fees
of any kind assessed in such instances?
6) Are the courts able to enforce debt contracts at a reasonable cost?
Sub-questions: What is the average length of time it takes a large
bank to recover a debt from a medium sized, solvent, enterprise that
has no substantive defense? How many lawyer hours are required? Is
interest available from the time the debt arose? From entry of
judgement in the first instance court? At what rate?
7) Is the highest court/courts hearing appeals in civil matters able
to set policy and rationalize the law?
Sub-questions: How many cases did the highest court hear last year?
How many judges does it have? Does the court have any discretion in
deciding what cases to accept?
8) Are the courts able to complement the work of the police and the
prosecution?
Sub-questions: What is the average time from detention to judgement
in a case involving a serious crime (homicide, rape, serious assault)?
What percentage of the total prisoner population awaits trial? What
percentage has not appeared before any court?
D. Access
1) How many judges sit for court outside the national capital per
100,000? For federal states, same question per state or provincial
capitals.
2) Are citizens able to determine what their rights and duties are
under the law?
Sub-questions: Are statute laws and secondary
legislation/administrative norms regularly published? Are copies of
these laws distributed to courts outside the capital? Have the
criminal laws been codified? Those affecting the family (inheritance,
child custody, divorce)? Have booklets, information brochures, or
other material explaining the law in simplified terms available? Is
there an information office/kiosk or other means for informing
citizens about the law in first instance court houses in rural areas?
3) In those areas where large numbers of residents do not speak the
national language, are court interpreters available?
4) Are methods of alternative dispute resolution available?
Sub-questions: Is there a law permitting disputes to be resolved
using alternative dispute resolution methods? Is it considered
adequate by lawyers and litigants? Are there informal means
(panchayats, community councils, jueces de paz) for settling family
matters, land disputes, and other cases involving the poor? Are they
biased against identifiable groups (women, the landless, etc.)?
5) Does the state furnish indigent criminal defendants with a lawyer?
ANNEX V: USAID Checklist for Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet
Union (Matt Mosner, USAID/ENI)
[I do not know whether the list was ever applied; it comes closer to a
checklist than the foregoing example, but the individual questions are
extremely broad. There is no indication of whether a quantitative
scoring system was intended]
1. The Courts are independent and coequal with other branches of
government
- The judicial branch is independently funded, organized and
administered, and has complete control over its own budget;
- Judicial selection and promotion is based on merit;
- judicial salaries are on a par with those in the private sector for practicing
lawyers;
- judges, lawyers and the general public have open,
unimpeded access to all official, codified, written versions of the
law, as they enter into force. As a corollary, the process of law
and rule-making by either the court, the legislature, government or
the executive is fair, open, transparent, and accessible to all, with
opportunity for public access, comment and participation;
- judges are regularly trained or given access to new judicial practices and
procedures and new and/or evolving laws;
- judges, court officers,
lawyers, legislators, and other government officials are governed by
written codes of ethics, which in practice govern their behavior, and
which codes are enforced by active investigative and enforcement
authorities.
2. A constitution and the relevant civil, commercial and criminal laws
have the force of law, and support democratic processes and market
reforms
- A new constitution is in place that supports the separation of
powers and democratic governance;
- Democratically elected federal
and regional legislatures have been elected that have the power to
enact legislation that is responsive to democratic society. These
legislatures are responsible to their electorate, conduct business
openly, utilize public hearings, base decisions on a written record
that is accessible to the general population, etc.;
- the legislature is the sole authority to enact legislation (instead of the executive
acting by decree) and has passed new laws supporting market economy in
areas such as civil, commercial, and criminal law.
3. A viable legal profession exists that helps organize the training lf law students,
the ongoing training of practicing professionals, and that can
regulate its own ethical and professional conduct.
- Legal, educational establishments are in place, open to all, funded
by a mixture of private and public money, which offer students
training in all areas of the law relevant to supporting a market
economy;
- The legal profession provides its members with ongoing
training and access to information about evolving law and governs
itself by a code of ethics and professional responsibility that works
in practice to enforce those rules and keep the public trust in legal
institutions;
- Law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and
investigators are governed by the same code of ethics, as the general
bar, and are subject to the same disciplinary rules and regulations
and sanctions as other legal professionals and general citizenry.
4. Laws are applied and enforced consistent with the written language of
those laws and the expressed intent of the legislatures that drafted
and passed them.
- The legislative history of any law is based on an official written
record that is accessible to the general public and kept as an
official, enforceable government record;
- Judges and other empowered
government officials enforce the law as it is written, and are
sanctioned under force of law, for their failure to do so;
- Modernized court and trial procedures, including case management and
court statistical and tracking systems are in place
- Court decisions are based only on the written law accessible to the general public,
and those decisions are themselves reflected in written decisions,
after a written record of proceedings is taken that provides the basis
for appeal, and public access to all aspects of the proceedings;
- Criminal proceedings are prosecuted only in accordance with
international standards of human rights, the relevant national
constitution, and all other local laws;
- Criminal trials are also
governed by rules of evidence and rules of procedured governing
prosecutorial behavior, requiring the state to provide defendants with
notice of the charges against him, the right to counsel, access to the
state's evidence, the right to bail and pre-trial release, etc;
5. The general population is aware of the laws, accepts their
applicability, acts in accordance with them.
- The legal system successfully operates to prevent/punish violations
of the law by public officials, criminals, etc;
- Citizens accept the
importance and value of equal rights for all;
- Citizens expect the
timely and impartial application of all laws;
- Citizens have a
general understanding of their legal rights, know how to exercise
them, and are familiar with the general elements;
- To the extent
that violations of the law and crimes take place, the public interest
groups, specific groups NGO's and the media each have the right and
the ability to voice and effect change concerning the legal system.
ANNEX VI: ABA/CEELI Checklist on Judicial Independence
[This is a work in progress, and along with Blackton's report card,
comes closest to what the working group appears to want. It does
include a scoring system, suggesting that countries will receive an
overall ranking. Although the topic is judicial independence, the
contents address a much wider range of issues]
9/20/99 Draft
A METHODOLOGY FOR MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE*
© ABA/CEELI 1999
INTRODUCTION
The following is a survey, developed by the American Bar
Association's Central and East European Law Initiative (CEELI),
designed to quantify the independence of the judiciary in any given
country. An independent judiciary is widely perceived as an
essential component of democracy, and in an era where the countries of
Central Europe and the former Soviet Union are undergoing a difficult
and lengthy transition to democracy, CEELI determined that it was
appropriate to develop a methodology for measuring judicial
independence in order to help CEELI, its funders, and the emerging
democracies themselves better target judicial reform programs.
0 Defining Judicial Independence
CEELI developed this survey well aware of the obstacles to
quantitatively measuring judicial independence. First, there is no
simple, universally accepted definition of "judicial independence."
"[J]udicial independence may be one of the least understood concepts
in the fields of political science and law. . . . This is especially
true in reference to judicial independence during the democratization
process; its manifestations, limitations, and meaning, as well as
fostering greater autonomy among a transitional country's judges, have
not been thoroughly explored." Larkins, "Judicial Independence and
Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis," 44 Am. J.
Comp. L. 605, 607 (1996); see also Tacha, "Independence of the
Judiciary for the Third Century," 46 Mercer L. Rev. 645, 645 (1995)
("Although the general principle of judicial independence enjoys broad
support, its definition is elusive.").
Nevertheless, some definitions of judicial independence have been
reached. Most American commentators note that judicial independence
has both institutional and individual components. "In its
institutional form, it is a corollary to the principle of separation
of powers. That is, the judiciary is a vital branch of government
with constitutionally delegated powers, and . . . must be free to act
and interact with the other two branches. . . . In its individualized
sense, judicial independence means simply that a life-tenured federal
judge is free to decide cases in a wholly impartial manner." Tacha,
supra, at 645 - 46; see also Abrahamson, "Remarks Before the American
Bar Association Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial
Independence," 12 St. John's J. Legal Comment, 69, 70 (1996)
(describing institutional and individual components of judicial
independence); Fiss, "The Limits of Judicial Independence," 25 U.
Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 57, 58 - 59 (1993) (noting that judicial
independence requires both independence from the parties in
litigation, individual autonomy, and political insularity). Larkins
builds on this concept to state that "[j]udicial independence refers
to the existence of judges who are not manipulated for political gain,
who are impartial toward the parties of a dispute, and who form a
judicial branch which has the power as an institution to regulate the
legality of government behavior, enact 'neutral' justice, and
determine significant constitutional and legal values." Larkins,
supra, at 611; see also Cohen, "The Chinese Communist Party and
'Judicial Independence:' 1949 - 1959," 82 Harv. L. Rev. 967, 973
(1969) (at a minimum, judicial independence means "that political
organs will not interfere with the application of these legal sources
(constitutions, statutes, regulations, rules of decisions, and other
sources of authority) to the facts of particular cases. . . . [I]t
should also mean that political organs will not inflict deprivation
upon honest judges who make undesired decisions, nor reward those who
make favored decisions."); Plank, "The Essential Elements of Judicial
Independence and the Experience of Pre-Soviet Russia," 5 Wm. & Mary
Bill Rts. J. 1, 8 (1996) (the essential elements of judicial
independence are "(1) guarantee of a fixed tenure, subject to a
limited process of removal or discipline for misconduct or disability;
(2) fixed and adequate compensation; (3) sufficiently high minimum
qualifications in education and experience; and (4) limited judicial
immunity.").
1 Quantifying Judicial Independence
Second, the concept of an independent judiciary inherently tends
towards the qualitative and cannot be measured simply by counting the
number of judges or courtrooms in a country. It is difficult to find
and interpret "evidence of impartiality, insularity, and the scope of
a judiciary's authority as an institution." Larkins, supra, at 611 et
seq. Larkins cites the following faults in prior efforts to measure
judicial independence: "(1) the reliance on formal indicators of
judicial independence which do not match reality, (2) the dearth of
appropriate information on the courts which is common to comparative
judicial studies, (3) the difficulties inherent in interpreting the
significance of judicial outcomes, or (4) the arbitrary nature of
assigning a numerical score to some attributes of judicial
independence." Id. at 615. Larkins goes on to specifically criticize
a 1975 study by David S. Clark which sought to numerically measure the
autonomy of Latin American Supreme Courts. In developing his
"judicial effectiveness score," Clark included such indicators as
tenure guarantees, method of removal, method of appointment, and
salary guarantees. Clark, "Judicial Protection of the Constitution in
Latin America," 2 Hastings Const. L. Q. 405 - 442 (1975). "The
problem, though, is that these formal indicators of judicial
independence often did not conform to reality. For example, although
Argentine justices had tenure guarantees, the Supreme Court had
already been purged at least five times since the 1940s. By including
these factors, Clark overstated . . . the independence of some
countries' courts, placing such dependent courts as Brazil's ahead of
Costa Rica's, the country which is almost universally seen as having
the most independent judicial branch in Latin America." Larkins,
supra, at 615.
Third, reliance on subjective rather than objective criteria may be
equally susceptible to criticism. E.g., Larkins, supra, at 618
(critiquing methodology which consisted of polling 84 social
scientists regarding Latin American courts as little more than
hearsay). Moreover, one cannot necessarily obtain reliable
information by interviewing judges: "[j]udges are not likely to admit
that they came to a certain conclusion because they were pressured by
a certain actor; instead, they are apt to hide their lack of
autonomy." Larkins, supra, at 616.
2 CEELI's Methodology
CEELI sought to address these criticisms by including both subjective
and objective criteria, and by basing the criteria for an independent
judiciary on some fundamental international norms such as those set
out in the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary; Council of Europe Recommendation R(94)12 "On the
Independence, Efficiency, and Role of Judges;" and Council of Europe,
the European Charter on the Statute for Judges. Reference was also
made to a Concept Paper on Judicial Independence prepared by CEELI and
criteria used by the International Association of Judges in evaluating
membership applications.
Following these norms, CEELI compiled a series of 33 statements
setting forth the characteristics of an independent judiciary. Each
statement or series of statements is followed by a brief commentary
citing the basis for the statement and discussing the importance of
those criteria and why it was included. A particular effort was made
not to give higher regard to American as opposed to European concepts
of judicial independence. The categories considered include
selection and appointment procedures, education and training, budget
and salary allocations, safeguards from improper outside influences,
jurisdiction and judicial powers, transparency of process, ethics,
work conditions, assignment of cases, and support for the judiciary by
non-governmental organizations.
The methodology for scoring is as follows. Each statement is be
allocated a value ranging from 5 to 1. Where the statement most
corresponds to the reality in any given country, the country is given
a score of 5 for that statement (thus, if all of the statements were
true in the country being polled, that country would have a very
independent judiciary). On the other hand, if the statement is not at
all representative of the conditions in that country, it is given a 1.
Conditions that fall between these extremes are to be given an
appropriate intermediate "score." Based upon its total numerical
score, the country will then fall into one of four categories: "very
independent" (highest numerical score, 134 - 165 range); "somewhat
independent" (100 - 133 range); "somewhat controlled" (67 - 99 range);
and "controlled judiciary" (lowest numerical score, 33 - 66 range).
Cf. Cohen, supra, at 972 (suggesting that the degree of judicial
independence exists on a continuum from "a completely unfettered
judiciary to one that is completely subservient.").
In the interest of simplicity and despite the potential for criticism,
we have decided against giving different questions different values or
weights; instead, all questions have been given equal weight. This
problem has been partially addressed by including more statements in
the more important categories; for example, there are eight statements
relating to potential improper influences and only two statements
relating to education and training.
Some of the subjective criteria would best be ascertained through
public opinion polls or through extensive interviews of lawyers and
court personnel. Aware of cost and time constraints, however, we
decided to address these issues so that they could generally be
answered by questioning some judges, journalists, and outside
observers knowledgeable concerning the judicial system. Overall, the
survey is intended to be implemented by one or more individuals who
are generally familiar with the country and region and who would
gather the objective information and conduct the interviews necessary
to reach a scoring decision as to the more subjective criteria. The
final scoring report would also briefly explain how the "scoring"
decisions for each statement were reached.
One of the purposes of the survey is to help CEELI and its primary
funder, the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), as well as other organizations working in this area, such as
the World Bank, determine the efficacy of their judicial reform
programs and help to target future assistance. Many of the issues
raised (such as judicial salaries and improper outside influences), of
course, cannot be directly and effectively addressed by outside
providers of assistance. And we recognize as well that those areas of
judicial independence that can be addressed by outsiders, such as
judicial training, may not be the most important. Having the most
exquisitely educated cadre of judges in the world is no guarantee of
an independent judiciary; and yet, an independent judiciary does need
to be well trained. Moreover, the nexus between outside assistance
and the country's judiciary may be tenuous, at best: building a truly
independent judiciary requires real political will and dedication on
the part of the reforming country. Nevertheless, some sort of
objective, quantifiable measurement is necessary to better focus
reform efforts, and to provide a means of comparison between different
countries.
The real test of the utility of the system will be in its
application. CEELI is currently planning to test the survey against
four judiciaries: two in western democracies and two in countries in
transition. The survey may be revised depending on the perceived
accuracy of these "trial runs" or on any practical difficulties of
implementation.
Finally, it should be noted that although this survey has been
developed by ABA/CEELI, it has not been officially sanctioned by the
Board of Governors of the American Bar Association, and the ABA does
not intend, through this mechanism, to officially rank the judiciaries
of the various states in the United States or of other countries.
Rather, as discussed above, CEELI prepared this survey because the
agencies that fund programs aimed at supporting judicial independence
require some quantifiable measure of the impact of their programs and
some tool for refining their implementation.
ABA/CEELI JUDICIAL REFORM SURVEY
1 Selection and Appointment
1. Judges are appointed based solely on objective criteria such as
passage of an exam, performance in law school, other training,
experience, professionalism, and reputation in the legal community.
2. Ethnic and religious minorities, as well as both genders, are
represented amongst the pool of nominees and in the judiciary
generally.
COMMENTARY
UN Principle No. 10 provides, "Any method of judicial selection shall
safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives. In the
selection of judges, there shall be no discrimination against a person
on the grounds of race, color, sex, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or status . . ."
The selection and appointment of judges is one of the most basic and
important issues to be considered in measuring the independence of the
judiciary. Unfortunately, whether or not a country's
selection/appointment procedures meet the UN aspirational principle
set out above is extremely difficult to determine. There are several
different methods of appointment.
Chief executive selection. In a state ruled by a dictatorship, the
chief executive is solely responsible for judicial appointments.
Obviously, this opens the door to appointments based purely on
cronyism or controllability. In such a situation, the judge simply
becomes a tool of the state and the individual litigant cannot expect
to receive fair treatment.
Judicial election. In some jurisdictions (e.g., Texas and for some
courts in New York), judges are elected by the voting public. At
first blush, this selection method does not appear as threatening to
judicial independence as the method described above. An elected
judge, however, is less likely to be able to freely perform one of the
key but most unpopular functions of a judge in a democratic society:
Protecting minority and individual rights. This is not to say that
elected judges never protect such rights; however, if they do so, they
may well lose the next election. The situation can be mitigated, of
course, if judges are elected for extended terms, of ten years or
more, and if they are prohibited from standing for reelection. Even
then, however, there are problems associated with the judge being
overly beholden to the political party that backed his or her election
(which, of course, may also be a problem with an appointed judge). A
different sort of threat to judicial independence can arise from the
pressures of fundraising that are inherent to a modern election
campaign.
Board Selection. In other states, a panel of experts may either name
the judges or recommend to the Chief Executive candidates qualified
for appointment. This is the method recommended by European Charter
Principle 1.3: "In respect of every decision affecting the selection,
recruitment, appointment, career progress or termination of office of
a judge, the statute envisages the intervention of an authority
independent of the executive and legislative powers within which at
least one half of those who sit are judges elected by their peers
following methods guaranteeing the widest representation of the
judiciary."
Appointment from Law School. In most civil law countries, law school
students go on a judicial track quite early in their careers, and are
appointed to the judiciary directly from law school. Plank, supra, at
36.
Minority and gender representation. European Charter Principle 2.1
prohibits any judicial "candidate being ruled out by reason only of
their sex, or ethnic or social origin, or by reason of their
philosophical and political opinions or religious convictions." This
consideration is important because, although judges are charged with
resolving the disputes that society brings before them (and therefore,
in a certain sense, must be "above" society), they must also fairly
represent society. In addition, minority representation in the
judiciary will be key to protecting minority rights and implementing
the rule of law in many countries, such as the former Yugoslavia,
where minority repression remains a cause of conflict and violence.
Some statistics in this area can, however, be misleading. In the
former Soviet bloc, for example, women often represented up to 70 % of
the judiciary. This was not an indicia of the progressiveness of the
region's judiciary, but rather of the low level of esteem with which
the judiciary was regarded: being a judge was considered almost a
part time job which a woman could do and still have time to take care
of her family. Few women, however, filled leadership positions, such
as presidents of courts. In addition, men dominated the procuracy,
again indicating where the real power in the legal system resided.
2 Education and Training
3. Judges have formal university level training in the law and, in
addition, before taking the bench are required (without cost to the
judges) to take a series of courses concerning the substantive and
procedural areas of the law that they will be working in, as well as
concerning the role of the judge in society and cultural sensitivity.
4. Judges must undergo, on a regular basis and without cost to them,
professionally prepared and judge-taught continuing legal education
courses, the subject matters of which are generally determined by the
judges themselves and which inform them of changes and development in
the law.
0 COMMENTARY
A truly independent judiciary, in order to apply the law fairly, must
know what the law is. As UN Principle No. 10 provides, "Persons
selected for judicial office shall be individuals of integrity and
ability with appropriate training or qualifications in the law."
Judges must also be aware of how their colleagues are handling issues
and cases that they frequently are addressing. This means that new
judges must be educated concerning the law, and receive additional
training concerning issues of specific relevance to judges after
appointment or designation. European Charter Principle 2.3 mandates
that judicial appointees receive "appropriate training at the expense
of the state." In addition, continuing legal education programs are
vital if judges are to understand changes in laws, and if the laws are
to be applied with any consistency. In many remote regions of Eastern
Europe, for example, the judges do not receive copies of the laws and
are relying on outdated materials. In order to be able to do their
jobs properly, judges need to be systematically informed of changes to
legislation. Finally, is important for judges to have control over
what they are studying in such CLE courses; the government should not
dictate what the judges are learning about. See Plank, supra, at 31 -
31 (noting that judges must possess "sufficient education and
knowledge to discern the law and to articulate bases for a decision"
and that "an educational requirement allows the judges to command the
respect of litigants and society.").
3 Budget
5. The following percentage of the country's or state's national
budget is allocated to the judiciary (not including Ministry of
Justice and police costs, for example, but including judicial and
administrative staff salaries, court education and training, court
maintenance, costs for jurors, lay assessors, etc.):
1. 0.04% or less
2. 0.05% - 0.19%
3. 0.20% - 0.34%
4. 0.35% - 0.49%
5. 0.50% or more
6. The judiciary has a meaningful opportunity to influence the amount
of money allocated to it by the legislative and/or executive branches
and, once funds are allocated to the judiciary, the judiciary has
control over its own budget and how such funds are expended.
COMMENTARY
Adequate funding. A judiciary that is well-educated and fairly
appointed will serve little use if it is not provided with sufficient
operating funds, and the discretion to use those funds as it sees fit.
As UN Principle No. 7 provides, "It is the duty of each Member State
to provide adequate resources to enable the judiciary to properly
perform its functions;" see also European Charter Principle 1.6 ("The
State has the duty of ensuring that judges have the means necessary to
accomplish their tasks properly, and in particular to deal with cases
within a reasonable period."). The UN Principles do not define what
is meant by the term "adequate," and obviously, the relative amounts
dedicated to the judiciaries of various states will vary widely
depending upon those states' relative wealth. Accordingly, we have
chosen to look at percentages of national budgets allocated to the
judiciary. The percentages allocated in countries that are generally
considered to have independent judiciaries are surprisingly small. In
1995, for example, costs for the judiciary consisted of less than a
fifth of one percent of the total U.S. federal budget. Tacha, supra,
at 649.
Judicial involvement in budgeting/spending. European Charter
Principle 1.8 states that "[j]udges are associated . . . in decisions
relating to the administration of the courts and as to the
determination of their means, and their allocation at a national and
local level." Obviously, as in the United States, the judiciary will
be beholden to a certain extent to the branch of government that
controls the purse strings; the judiciary is unlikely to have a
separate tax and spend authority. It is also important, therefore,
that the judiciary have a means for lobbying Congress or Parliament.
For the U.S. federal courts, this is done by the Chief Justice of the
United States or associated justices through the Administrative Office
of the Federal Courts. Lobbying may also be done through non-
governmental associations of judges.
Additionally, it is critical that the judiciary itself have control
over - or at least substantial input into - how its budget is
expended.
The role of the ministry of justice may be important here. In the
United States, it is seen as key to judicial independence that the
judiciary administers itself. But the Department of Justice in fact
did administer the U.S. court system until 1939, when Congress passed
the Administrative Office Act, which established the Administrative
Office of United States Courts. Moreover, even today in many modern
European countries such as Germany, and France, the courts are
administered through the ministries of justice. Even in the United
States, the judiciary is beholden to a certain extent to the executive
branch, which nominates its members and enforces its decisions, and to
the legislative branch, which confirms the appointments and provides
the overall funding. Accordingly, the issue is not whether the
judiciary is funded through the ministry of justice, but rather
whether the executive branch uses that funding methodology as a means
of controlling or curtailing the activities of the judiciary. And
transfer of budgetary control from the ministry to the judiciary
itself is no guarantee of judicial independence: Russia recently made
such a transfer, but that system is so beset by other problems that
its independence is at least questionable.
4 Salary
7. The salary of a senior level judge is generally comparable to the
salary of:
- A government-employed bus driver or sanitation worker;
- A government-employed clerk or police officer;
- A public prosecutor;
- A cabinet-level minister or member of parliament;
- The president of the country.
8. Salary levels in the judiciary are formally linked to the salary
levels of other government officials, so that, for example, Parliament
may not vote a pay raise for itself or for executive officials without
also raising the pay for the judiciary by the same rate.
9. Judicial salaries generally may not be decreased, unless as a part
of government-wide budgetary cuts.
0 COMMENTARY
Adequacy of judicial salaries. A country will not be able to attract
capable lawyers to its judiciary unless it sufficiently compensates
them. Salaries also need to be sufficient in order to counter the
dangers of bribery. See European Charter Principle 6.1 ("[j]udges . .
. are entitled to remuneration, the level of which is fixed so as to
shield them from pressures aimed at influencing their decisions . . .
. "). Obviously, in the United States and many other countries
lawyers can make much more money in private practice than in
government service. But judicial salaries must be such that they are
at least comparable to the salaries of other high-level government
employees. In other words, it would be inequitable, and the people
would see it as such, if the nation's Chief Justice were paid less
than half of what the President is paid. Similarly, it sends the
wrong message if prosecutors are paid more than judges. In many
countries in Eastern Europe, judges have been paid less than policemen
or bus drivers. This is unacceptable, even in a civil law country
where judges may take the bench at a very young age, directly from
university. Without examining the actual salaries paid (which could
range broadly depending on the economies in each country), we decided
that the best way to measure the relative worth of the judiciary is to
compare the salaries of senior level judges (for example, members of
the Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, or other high level appellate
courts) with the salaries of other government employees.
Salary guarantees. UN Principle No. 11 states, "The term of office of
judges, their independence, security, adequate remuneration,
conditions of service, pensions and the age of retirement shall be
adequately secured by law." Art. III, section 4 of the United States
Constitution provides that compensation for judges cannot be
diminished while in office. See also Plank, supra, at 29 - 31
(describing importance of fixed and adequate compensation and noting
that "[a]ttracting able judges will help sustain a reasonably high
respect for the judiciary.").
5 Safeguards from Improper Governmental and Non-Governmental
Influences
10. Senior level judges are appointed for the following terms:
- Senior level judges may be removed, without cause, at any time;
- 1 - 5 years;
- 5 - 10 years;
- 10 - 20 years;
- Life.
11. Judges may be removed from office or otherwise punished only for
specified official misconduct, and through a transparent process,
governed by objective criteria.
12. Judicial decisions are made without outside political pressure.
13. Judicial decisions are made without improper influences by
litigants or other interested parties.
14. Judges have immunity for actions taken in their official capacity.
15. Judicial decisions may be reversed only through judicial appellate
process.
16. Judges are free from threats such as assault and assassination.
17. Judges are advanced through the judicial system on the basis of
objective criteria such as rate of reversal by higher court, numbers
of cases handled, etc.
0 COMMENTARY
Improper influence. These issues are difficult to address because
attempts to improperly influence the judicial process, whether by the
government or by individuals, are inherently secretive and almost
always involve criminal activity. Judges in most countries,
accordingly, are very unwilling to discuss the problem. The UN Basic
Principles, however, recognize the importance of this issue.
Principle No. 2 provides, "The judiciary shall decide matters before
them [sic] impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with
the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements,
pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any
quarter or for any reason." UN Principle No. 4 goes on to state,
"There shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with
the judicial process, nor shall judicial decisions by the courts be
subject to revision. This principle is without prejudice to judicial
review or to mitigation or commutation by competent authorities of
sentences imposed by the judiciary, in accordance with the law."
Improper influence takes many forms. The prototype of governmental
interference was the "telephone justice" prevalent during the
communist era in Central and Eastern Europe, where government
officials or prosecutors would call judges to instruct them on how to
decide cases. The threat implicit in such calls was the loss of job
or advancement, or a lowered salary or benefits (for example, the
judge's apartment). See Larkins, supra, at 608 ("judicial independence
takes on critical significance when the government is one of the
parties to a dispute . . . . [I]t is important that judges not be
subject to control by the regime, and that they be shielded from any
threats, interference, or manipulation which may either force them to
unjustly favor the state or subject themselves to punishment for not
doing so. The rule of law is not secure when the body for its
enforcement is composed of judges who either fear challenging the
government or are already predisposed toward declaring its deeds
legal.").
As a general matter, improper influence by litigants or other
interested parties most typically takes the form of bribery, about
which one hears many stories in Eastern Europe today but which are
difficult to confirm. A more extreme form of intimidating the
judiciary is threatening its membership with violence; a memorable
example is the campaign of terror waged against Italian judges by the
Mafia in the early 1990s, the on-going threat against Colombian judges
by the drug cartel in that country, and assaults on Albanian judges in
1996.
A more subtle form of interference or intimidation is the political
caterwauling that follows unpopular judicial decisions. In 1997,
Judge Baer of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York was threatened with impeachment because he had
excluded evidence relating to the alleged sale of illegal narcotics,
finding that the police did not have probable cause to search and
seize simply because the suspects ran away from the arresting police
officers. The subsequent public outcry led to a call for Judge Baer's
impeachment, but no action was ultimately taken. The Baer and other
political controversies are described in more detail at Plank, supra,
at 25, fn. 78; see also Cox, "The Independence of the Judiciary:
History and Purposes," 21 U. of Dayton L. Rev. 566, 574 - 75 (1996)
(noting that judicial "bashing" in the United States has a long and
distinguished tradition dating back to Thomas Jefferson).
We have selected a number of objectively identifiable steps that can
be taken to protect, at least to some extent, the judiciary from
improper influences. Specifically:
Lifetime or long-term appointment to office and irremovability. UN
Principle No. 12 provides, "Judges, whether appointed or elected,
shall have guaranteed tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the
expiry of their term of office." UN Principle No.18 additionally
states, "Judges shall be subject to suspension or removal only for
reasons of incapacity or behaviour that renders them unfit to
discharge their duties." In addition, UN Principle No. 17 provides
that a "judge shall have a right to a fair hearing" in any
disciplinary matters. UN Principle No. 20 adds, "Decisions in
disciplinary, suspension, or removal proceedings should be subject to
an independent review." See also European Charter Principle 1.3 ("In
respect of every decision affecting the selection, recruitment,
appointment, career progress or termination of office of a judge, the
statute envisages the intervention of an authority independent of the
executive and legislative powers within which at least one half of
those who sit are judges elected by their peers following methods
guaranteeing the widest representation of the judiciary."); Plank,
supra, at 10 -14 (discussing importance of this aspect of judicial
independence, and noting that federal judges in the United States have
life tenure, while judges in a few American states, Canada, France,
and Germany have permanent tenure; judges in Japan are appointed for
10 year terms, while members of Mexico's Supreme Court of Justice have
fifteen year terms). That a judge may face reappointment could raise
questions concerning "the extent to which they can exercise their
judgement [sic] free from inappropriate outside pressures." Id. at
13. Of course, the tenure of a judge must be balanced by some method
of accountability, but if a judge is to be removed or otherwise
punished, it must be through a fair and transparent process.
Clearly, any action taken against a judge must occur "for reasons
other than her interpretation of the law in a particular case." Id.
at 14. Many countries generally considered to have independent
judiciaries, such as France and Germany, discipline their judges
through tribunals composed primarily or entirely of judges. Id. at 19
- 22 (also describing methods of discipline in the United States,
Pakistan, Japan, and Argentina).
Immunity for official actions taken is another important indicia of
judicial independence. UN Principle No. 16 provides that "judges
should enjoy personal immunity from civil suits for monetary damages
for improper acts or omissions in the exercise of their judicial
function." Although not explicit in the UN Principles, and subject to
the need for appropriate disciplinary procedures, it goes without
saying that judges should have immunity from criminal prosecution for
official actions taken. See Plank, supra, at 32 - 33 (discussing
immunity generally, and concluding that judges should also have some
form of protection from civil liability). And, as noted above,
judicial decisions should only be reviewed through an appropriate
appellate process.
Advancement based on objective criteria is also an important indicia
of judicial independence. UN Principle No. 13 provides, "Promotion of
judges . . . should be based on objective factors, in particular
ability, integrity, and experience."
We recognize that some of our questions -- such as "judicial
decisions are made without outside political pressure" and "judicial
decisions are made without improper influences by litigants or other
interested parties" -- call for subjective judgments. There simply
is no way for those questions to be answered in a fully objective
fashion; rather, they will call for discussions with judges, lawyers,
and journalists. Responses to such questions will require, however,
concrete examples from the press concerning reports of improper
judicial interference.
6 Jurisdiction and Judicial Powers
18. The judicial branch, or some part of it, has the power to
determine the constitutionality of legislation and official acts, and
such decisions are enforced.
19. The judiciary has exclusive jurisdiction over all cases concerning
civil rights and liberties.
20. The judiciary works under uniform rules of evidence and procedure
that facilitate the conduct of orderly trials and hearings.
21. Judges have meaningful subpoena, contempt, and enforcement powers.
0 COMMENTARY
Judicial jurisdiction. The power of the judiciary would indeed be
hollow if it did not have the power, ultimately, to say "what the law
is." See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). UN Principle No.
3 provides: "The judiciary shall have jurisdiction over all issues of
a judicial nature and shall have exclusive authority to decide whether
an issue submitted for its decision is within its competence as
defined by law." UN Principle No. 5 additionally states, "Everyone
shall have the right to be tried by ordinary courts or tribunals using
established legal procedures. Tribunals that do not use the duly
established procedures of the legal process shall not be created to
displace the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary courts or judicial
tribunals."
Similarly, the civil judiciary should have exclusive jurisdiction of
cases involving the rights and liberties of civilians. In some
countries, military courts have control over cases involving
civilians. The appellate process for military courts, moreover,
should culminate in a civilian court. In the United States, for
example, the Supreme Court has the right and power to overturn
decisions by military courts.
In some countries, however, the judiciary does not have the power to
determine the constitutionality of governmental actions, or to
determine its own powers. Even in the United States, a subtle
infringement on judicial independence may be seen in the mandatory
sentencing guidelines that are currently in place in the U.S. federal
court system. But see Mistretta v. United States,488 U.S. 361 (1989)
(upholding constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
Rules of evidence and procedure. In a country ruled "by laws, not
men," the individuals who serve as judges must also operate under an
orderly set of rules. Such rules are necessary, moreover, in order to
give substance to the ideal of equal protection under the law.
Contempt/subpoena/enforcement. The judiciary must also have the
power to control its own courtrooms and to compel the appearance of
witnesses. A complaint often voiced by judges and lawyers in Eastern
Europe is that judges do not have, or are unwilling to exercise, such
powers. A case can be stalled indefinitely simply by the failure of a
lawyer, witness, or a party to appear. Again, a judiciary unable to
control its own courtroom is unlikely to have the respect of the
citizenry or to be able to enforce the rule of law throughout the
country. It is also vital that the judiciary have some means, more
generally, to enforce its orders and judgments.
Judicial role in criminal justice. Finally, the courts must be seen
as being at the apex of the justice system. As such, the judiciary
must be able to control (and declare unconstitutional) certain acts of
the state. The prosecution and police must be controlled by a neutral
judiciary, not the other way around.
7 Transparency
22. Courtroom proceedings are open to, and can accommodate, the public
and the media.
23. Judicial decisions are published and open to academic and public
scrutiny.
24. A transcript or some other reliable record of courtroom
proceedings is maintained and is available to the public.
25. Courthouses are centrally located and easy to find, and provide a
respectable environment for the dispensation of justice.
0 COMMENTARY
The issue here relates largely to the public's perception of the
judiciary. We sought to develop questions that would reflect the
public trust and understanding of the judiciary, but that could be
answered without engaging in the costly process of polling. We added
the question concerning the location and accessibility of courthouses
because too often, under the communist regimes of Eastern Europe,
citizens did not know where the courthouse was until they were
arrested. Even today, some trial courts, for example, are hard to
find and not centrally located or easily identified. Again, this
gives an impression that justice is not an open process. Similarly,
we included the question concerning the appearance of the courtroom or
the courthouse because of the impression that is conveyed to the
public. In Romania, for example, the main courthouse in Bucharest is
old, dilapidated, and in general disrepair. In contrast, the Office
of the General Prosecutor is new, marble columned, and clean. It is
clear where the State is allocating its resources and where the real
power is.
8 Ethics
26. A code that governs the ethical conduct of judges (that generally
covers issues such as conflicts of interest, ex parte communications,
inappropriate political activity, etc.) is in place and enforced
(through a process that respects due process).
27. Before taking office and throughout their tenure, judges are
required to receive training concerning judicial ethics.
28. A meaningful process exists under which other judges, lawyers, and
the public may register complaints concerning judicial conduct.
0 COMMENTARY
A truly independent judiciary must function within clear ethical
guidelines. As UN Principle No 19 states, moreover, "All
disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings shall be determined in
accordance with established standards of judicial conduct."
None of the items listed above ensure that a judiciary will always
act in an ethical manner, but such at least serve as indicia of how
the society regards the importance of judicial ethics.
Finally, while we recognize that the term "meaningful" when used to
describe the judicial conduct process is subjective, the mere
existence of a judicial conduct process, without regard to its
quality, does not sufficiently respond to the question posed.
9 Caseloads and Work Conditions
29. The caseload of each judge is reasonable.
30. Each judge has the basic tools necessary to do his or her job,
e.g., sufficient office space, adequate support staff, word processing
equipment, a law library (whether physical or online), etc.
0 COMMENTARY
Caseload. Many judges in both the United States and Eastern Europe
complain that they cannot properly perform their jobs because of their
heavy workloads. Indeed, the dispensation of justice should not take
the form of an assembly line, where processing the cases becomes more
important than ensuring fair results. Although, the issue of
caseload is important, it is also difficult to measure. Rather than
try to determine the number of cases that is appropriate for each
judge to handle (which could vary widely in civil law and common law
countries), we determined to simply apply a subjective test of
reasonableness, and to rely on interviews with judges and lawyers to
obtain a score.
Working conditions. The question of appropriate workspace is clearly
subjective. Nevertheless, it is not appropriate to have three supreme
court justices working in one small office, as was the case in Romania
in 1994. The question of support staff is also somewhat subjective;
American judges, for example, have (and, because of the burden of
research and writing inherent to the common law system, require) much
larger staffs than their European colleagues; such also may reflect
more the litigiousness of Americans than anything else. On the other
hand, some courts have absolutely no support staff (no clerks to
assist with filing and no secretarial staff), and this clearly impedes
their efforts to dispense justice. The lack of any word processing
equipment would present a similar impediment. See Tacha, supra, at
648 ("In order for a judge to handle her caseload and maximize
productivity, she implicitly must possess adequate staff, equipment,
and physical facilities to carry out her responsibilities.
Independent judicial action requires an appropriate level of support
which allows a judge to carry out the judicial function without
relying on other entities, depending on someone else's assessment of
the judge's needs, or giving any thought in the case-deciding role to
tangential factors that might influence the speed of deliberation or
the outcome.").
10 Assignment of Cases
31. Judges are assigned to cases by an objective method, such as by
lottery, or according to their specific areas of expertise, and this
assignment process is administered by the judiciary, not the ministry
of justice.
32. Once assigned to a case, a judge may be removed only for good
cause, such as because of a conflict of interest or an unduly heavy
workload.
0 COMMENTARY
Too often, cases are in essence pre-decided by assigning them to
judges who are more "controllable" or "predictable." Absent special
reasons such as expertise or workload, judges should be assigned to
cases according to a blind, random method. UN Principle No. 14 notes,
"The assignment of cases to judges within the court to which they
belong is an internal matter of judicial administration."
11 Support by Non-Governmental Organizations
33. An association dedicated to protecting the interests of the
judiciary exists and is active.
0 COMMENTARY
UN Principle No. 8 states that "members of the judiciary are like
other citizens entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association
and assembly." UN Principle No. 9 provides, "Judges shall be free to
form and join associations of judges or other organizations to
represent their interests, to promote their professional training and
to protect their judicial independence." Similarly, European Charter
Principle 1.7 states that "[p]rofessional organizations, set up by
judges, and to which all judges may freely adhere, contribute notably
to the defence of those rights which are conferred on them by statute,
in particular in relation to authorities and bodies which are involved
in decisions regarding them."
In many of the countries of Eastern Europe, the Ministries of Justice
are directly responsible for administering the judiciary. Yet, many
of those Ministries, either for financial or political reasons, have
been unwilling to allocate appropriate resources (in terms of
salaries, training, security, and many of the other issues discussed
above) to the judiciary. Non-governmental associations of judges,
accordingly, have sprung up throughout the region to lobby for
improved conditions, help provide the training that the ministries are
either unwilling or unable to provide, and/or improve judicial
professionalism generally.
The existence of such an organization may be worth a point on the
scale, but the real question is whether it is active and effective.
Additional points should be provided where an association is engaged
in lobbying, training, or other activities supportive of an
independent and professional judiciary.
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